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The Separation of Powers:
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld - The Anti-
Roberts
Douglas W. Kmiec*
In the war on terror, the President does not have a blank check.
The question is: was he short-changed?
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-three decision, resolved Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld' against the President of the United States and his effort to create a
military tribunal system for purposes of trying those who are being detained
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Hamdan, in my judgment, is the anti-Roberts. It
is the antithesis of judicial humility over a subject matter that by
Constitutional plan has been given to the President and Congress. Roberts,
of course, can't be blamed. He was recused.2 It might be supposed that his
vote, being only one, would not have changed the outcome. This may
formally be true, but it understates the moderating influence his voice may
well have had on an opinion that is deeply at odds with the history of the
Court in wartime and both the law of the Constitution and statute.
Concurring, Justice Breyer wrote that the 178-page opinion might be
summarized as: The President doesn't have a blank check.3 This phrase has
become the popular summary of this long and complex decision, and
understandably, it is most often employed by the President's political
opponents. I am not one of them, even as I have openly questioned the
intelligence relied upon to justify America's entry into Iraq and believe the
President now needs to re-think our continued occupation in light of the
unconventional nature of the enemy.
* Caruso Family Chair and Professor of Constitutional Law, Pepperdine University. Professor
Kmiec served as head of the Office of Legal Counsel (U.S. Assistant Attorney General) for
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1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. Id. at 2799.
3. See id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536
(2004)) ("Congress has not issued the Executive a 'blank check."').
Those who employ the "blank check" phrase have a tendency to use it as
a bill of indictment to the effect that President Bush is callously disregarding
due process, privacy, and the statutory limits of the law.4 As evidence in
support of the political indictment, there is typically criticism of presidential
decisions to pursue a system of military tribunals, skepticism over the
detention of enemy combatants, allegations of lawlessness in the gathering
of military intelligence to prevent attack when that intelligence activity is
undertaken without Article III or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA)5 warrant, reminders of the shameful abuse at Abu Ghraib to bemoan
the use of aggressive interrogation techniques, and even concern over the
tendency of President Bush to raise separation of powers and other
constitutional qualifications in signing statements.
It is beyond the scope of this presentation to address each aspect of the
political indictment, but suffice it to say the President is not without
significant rebuttal, some of which will be presented following an
examination of the reasoning in Hamdan. It is important at the beginning,
however, simply to suggest that, with respect, Justice Breyer is deeply
mistaken to think the "blank check" remark is sufficient to evaluate either
the President's power or the need for the energetic use of that power to
defend the United States from radical Islam. So, let's do some initial
ground-clearing.
As a matter of policy, I submit there is common ground: that we face a
ruthless enemy that targets civilian populations, and hides behind and among
them; that this enemy has declared war and made war on the United States;
that, as in any war, captured enemy fighters need to be detained for some
period to prevent their return to the battle and for purposes of interrogation
to prevent attack; that there is reasonable evidence of an intelligence failure
pre-9/11 partially attributable to the unclarity of FISA procedures and a
mistaken wall of separation between law enforcement and foreign
surveillance; that the Constitution is indeed the supreme law of the land, but
it also not a suicide pact; that efforts to fight terrorism by routine criminal
prosecution is inconsistent with past wartime practice and based on the few
trials that have been conducted, like that of Moussaoui, neither
accommodating of needed interrogation nor observant of the defendant's
rights; that those who are being detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba should
be fairly and responsibly handled in a way that is accountable to our
traditions, as well as to the traditions observed by all free people; and that
the President's signing statements are, in the main, more hypothetical than
4. See 109 Cong. Rec. S10383 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Clinton).
5. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-63 (2003).
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constitutionally subversive. In short, as a matter of policy and wartime
reality, the bill of indictment against the President fails.
What about the law? As earlier noted, Justice Stevens' majority opinion
in Hamdan striking down the military tribunal system is remarkable for its
lack of humility. First, it vastly understates the founding role assigned to the
President. In THE FEDERALIST No. 70, Hamilton assumed "that all men of
sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive." 6 He noted in
particular that an energetic President is "essential to the protection of the
community against foreign attacks."7  Hamilton thus anticipated that
"[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch [would] generally [and
appropriately] characterise the proceedings of one man in a much more
eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number," including a
judicial committee of five. 8
Secondly, the Hamdan opinion shows little recognition of the
President's unique role and capacities in foreign affairs-a role previously
expounded by the Court in Curtiss-Wright.9  There Justice Sutherland
opined on the fundamental difference between foreign and domestic matters.
"The two classes of powers are different," Sutherland wrote for the Court:
both in respect of their origin and their nature. The broad statement
that the federal government can exercise no powers except those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied
powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the
enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our
internal affairs. '0
Moreover, "[i]n this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the nation."" Sutherland quotes John
Marshall in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of
Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."1 2
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
10. Id. at 315-16.
11. Id. at 319.
12. Id.
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Third, Hamdan ignores what Justice Sutherland assumed was well
established, namely, that:
within the international field, [the President] must often [be]
accord[ed] ...a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress [or the Court], has the
better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in
foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has
his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the
form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect
of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the
premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results. 3
Fourth, even if the Hamdan Court was not prepared to give the President
discretion in wartime foreign affairs, one might have supposed some
recognition of the ambiguities that inhere in constitutional assignments in
wartime. As Justice Jackson candidly remarked in his Youngstown
concurrence:
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty
of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete
problems of executive power as they actually present themselves.
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned
had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined from
materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon
to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan debate and
scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or
less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any
question. They largely cancel each other. And court decisions are
indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest
questions in the most narrow way. 14
Fifth, in recognition of the above, Justice Frankfurter cautioned the
Court "to be wary and humble. Such is the teaching of this Court's role in
the history of the country."' 15 Indeed, Justice Stevens shows no recognition
of the Court's historical circumspection in war matters. As Justice Brennan
once remarked, the Court has never fully developed a jurisprudence of
13. Id. at 320.
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
15. Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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national security. It is simply too episodic,' 6 he said. The late Chief Justice
Rehnquist agreed even as his own research showed greater willingness for
the Court to superintend-after the fact-the actions of the executive in
times of war or similar crisis. 
1 7
Sixth, even if Justice Stevens did not wish to be guided by founding
precept, constitutional assignment, precedent, or historical practice, Hamdan
might have been somewhat sensitive to the unique features of the war on
terror, which is neither a hot, nor cold, war in a traditional sense. Terrorism
has the potential to be not only hot, but blistering, and something which will
likely never be fully appreciated as having gone truly cold. With that
qualification, when the past decisions of the Court in times of hot or cold
war are examined for the information or guidance they do yield, what we
will see succinctly is that the judiciary has by conscious institutional choice
played little role during hot war and reserved its relatively rare attempts at
constitutional boundary-keeping to post-war analysis. In cold war periods,
there has been greater, but still infrequent, judicial involvement. In these
colder periods, an unvarnished claim of military emergency has not been
permitted to dispose of free speech claims made by citizens. Yet, prior to
Hamdan, no Court had ever second-guessed the military judgment of the
President on behalf of enemy combatants.
Seventh, apart from the question of presidential authority, there was a
reasonable basis to conclude that Congress had withdrawn jurisdiction in
Hamdan in reaction to Justice Steven's five-to-four opinion in the previous
term in Rasul v. Bush. 8 Rasul found a statutory habeas right running in
favor of the Guantanamo detainees.' 9  There was contrary precedent-a
World War II decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager2 0 that said rather plainly
that nothing in the text of the Constitution or in the statutes of the United
States confers a habeas right on aliens outside the territory of the United
States.2 ' Justice Stevens reasoned that subsequent cases triggered a statutory
right.
16. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of
Security Crises, Address at the law school of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel (Dec. 22,
1987).
17. Id
18. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
19. Id. at 483-84.
20. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
21. Id. at 768.
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In response, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
(DTA), providing with limited exception that "no court, justice, or judge,
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider" the habeas application of a
Guantanamo Bay detainee.22 The Court took that language in Hamdan and
changed it to "every court, justice or judge" shall have habeas jurisdiction if
the habeas pleading was pending on December 30.23 Justice Scalia labeled
the judicial revision "patently erroneous. 24
In fairness, it was an arguable point. Justice Stevens noted that in two
sections, not at issue in Hamdan, Congress expressly provided for
retroactive application.25 In Stevens' mind, this gave rise to the negative
inference that Hamdan's jurisdiction had not been withdrawn, as it was
pending prior to the DTA's effective date. Of course, the argument on the
other side is a presumption going back some centuries that laws repealing
jurisdiction without any reservation as to pending cases applies to all cases
pending and future. Ironically, the best expression of this principle was
articulated in the Landgraf 6 case in 1994 by none other than Justice
Stevens.27
HAMDAN- THE COURT AS COMMANDER?
Without the judicial humility embodied in the above considerations, the
Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld proceeded to find the President not to have
been given statutory authority for military commissions by the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) or the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). 2' The Court curiously chooses not to address the
President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief in wartime.
Justice Stevens writes stiffly: "Whether Chief Justice Chase was correct in
suggesting that the President may constitutionally convene military
commissions 'without the sanction of Congress' in cases of 'controlling
necessity' is a question this Court has not answered definitively, and need
not answer today.",
29
The Court goes on to say that military commissions must be authorized
either by statute or the law of war, and finds neither .30 The President points
22. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2742 (2005).
23. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2764.
26. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
27. Id. at 293.
28. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2749.
29. Id. at 2774.
30. Id. at 2830 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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to the broadly worded AUMF, which the Court found (per Justice O'Connor
just the year previous) authorized detention in Hamdi even overriding a
specific statute, the Non-Detention Act.3 Moreover, the President pointed
to the fact that the Congress also provided an appellate review procedure for
the President's military commissions in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
(DTA).32 That was merely reference, not affirmation, said Justice Stevens.33
The Court admits that Article 21 of the UCMJ permits a military
commission, but then grafts upon it a "jurisdictional pre-condition" of
"military necessity. ' 34 This is something the Court imports not from the
statute, but from a legal treatise. Privileging a legal treatise over the text of a
statute is, well, unusual. The Court then concludes that this "necessity" is
absent because Hamdan's alleged criminal activity occurred off the
battlefield and before 9/11.3' But might not even preparation at one remove
have advanced the planning of the attack? As Justice Thomas noted in the
dissent:
The text of the AUMF is backward looking, authorizing the use of
''all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001." Thus, the President's decision to try Hamdan by military
commission-a use of force authorized by the AUMF-for
Hamdan's involvement with al Qaeda prior to September 11, 2001,
fits crmfortably within the framework of the AUMF. In fact,
bringing the September 11 conspirators to justice is the primary
point of the AUMF. By contrast, on the plurality's logic, the
AUMF would not grant the President the authority to try Usama bin
Laden himself for his alternative involvement in the events of
September 11, 2001.36
Having found the commission to be unauthorized, it is not clear why the
Court then goes on in Part VI to find that the commissions created by the
President also failed to meet UCMJ standards, but dicta or not, the Court
31. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
32. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2763.
33. Id. at 2775.
34. Id. at 2820
35. Id. at 2777-78.
36. Id. at 2827 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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finds that under Article 36 of the UCMJ, no procedural rule for military
commissions may be "contrary to or inconsistent with" the UCMJ, and
further, the rules adopted must be "uniform insofar as practicable., 37 "That
is, the rules applied to military commissions must be the same as those
applied to courts-martial unless such uniformity proves impracticable. 38
The Court here almost gives the President a small increment of deference
implying that deviation from UCMJ standards would be permitted with a
proper presidential finding of impracticability. 39 But the generosity here
amounts to little since ultimately the Court suggests that such finding is
itself not possible because-in the Court's judgment-there is no
"exigency" to depart from the UCMJ rules. 4°
From the President's perspective, of course, there is some exigency in
the difficulty of prosecuting terror cases, itself. UCMJ rules equal or exceed
those in regular civilian courts, and acquiring evidence in wartime is
different from a preserved crime scene. 4' Evidence in a war setting is
gathered in circumstances that do not employ search warrants or Miranda
warnings, and therefore, would often be inadmissible in either a courts-
martial or Article III court. Nonetheless, Justice Stevens blithely writes:
"Nothing in the record demonstrates that it would be impracticable to apply
court-martial rules here. There is no suggestion of any logistical difficulty in
securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in applying the usual
principles of relevance and admissibility.,
42
The Court also brings the war on terror within the Geneva Convention.4 3
The Geneva Convention actually consists of four treaties. 44 Under article
49, 50, 129, and 146 of the Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV,
respectively, all signatory states are required to enact sufficient national law
to make grave violations of the Geneva Conventions a punishable criminal
offense.45 Geneva I is for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Geneva II is for the
37. Id. at 2790.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2791.
40. Id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., concurring).
41. See id. at 2790-91 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 2756.
43. Id. at 2795.
44. See id. at 2756-57.
45. See Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (Il) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, art. 50, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (Ill) relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, art. 129, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva III is relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War-first adopted in 1929 and revised in 1949; and Geneva IV is
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted in
1949 and based on the Hague Treaty of 1907. There are also three
additional protocols to the Geneva Convention: Protocol I of 1977: relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; Protocol II
also of 1977: relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts; and Protocol III (2005): relating to the Adoption of an
Additional Distinctive Emblem.
The President reasoned that Geneva did not apply to al Qaeda since it
was not a signatory nation, but an unlawful combatant fighting dishonorably
out of uniform, targeting civilians, and so forth.46 The Court says it is not
necessary to say whether the President is right to view al Qaeda as an
"unlawful" combatant or not because it asserts one portion of Geneva
applies to everyone--Common Article 3 of Geneva III (C3). 47 Prior to this
case, C3 was thought to cover internal armed conflict (not of an
international character).4 8  Relying on legal commentary, however, the
Court construes these words not geographically, but simply as an alternative
way of saying not "a conflict between nations., 49 Thus, the U.S. v. al Qaeda
war is included because al Qaeda is not a nation, but rather, a loosely
affiliated, world-wide set of radical Islamic "cells" with the announced
declaration ("fatwa") to kill Americans in the millions wherever found.
When the Court applies C3 in this fashion, protections must be given to
all manner of combatants (lawful or unlawful). While this does not
eliminate the distinction between honorable soldier and dishonorable
terrorist, it greatly narrows it misleadingly suggesting that both are a
prisoner of war. Most fundamentally, C3 provides that a detainee no longer
in active hostilities shall not be subject to "the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."50 The Court concludes
46. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761, 2782.
47. Id. at 2756-57.
48. See Geneva Convention (II) art. 3.
49. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2757.
50. Geneva Convention (III) art. 3.
that courts-martial, not military commissions, are the tribunals that are
regularly constituted.5
And what then are the "judicial guarantees" to be afforded "as
indispensable by civilized peoples"? 52 Answer-for the plurality, but not
Justice Kennedy-the provisions of Article 75 of Protocol I become the
articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of a detaining
power are entitled.53 Among the rights set forth in Article 75 is the "right to
be tried in [one's] presence. 54 Military commissions did not guarantee this
since the President thought it ill-advised to let the enemy in on classified
information.55 The enemies' counsel with appropriate security clearance, of
course, would be present. 6 Justice Stevens, and the plurality, found the
presence of counsel to be insufficient, even granting "[t]hat the Government
has a compelling interest in denying Hamdan access to certain sensitive
information . . . . [A]bsent express statutory provision to the contrary,
information used to convict a person of a crime must be disclosed to him."57
One would not know it by reading Hamdan, but Protocol I, which
includes Article 75, was never ratified by the United States.5 8 The United
States declined ratification because Article 44 within Protocol I proposed
dealing with unlawful combatants,59 in the manner contemplated by Justice
Stevens. In 1987, President Reagan explained the rejection noting that the
proposed modification to Geneva (Protocol I, art. 44(3)) was "fundamentally
and irreconcilably flawed [since it] would grant combatant status to irregular
forces even if they do not satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population and otherwise comply with the laws
of war.",60 This differentiation of lawful from unlawful combatant is not an
exercise of revenge or animus, but the preservation of civilization. The
51. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2757.
52. See id. at 2848.
53. Id.
54. Id; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), art. 75(4)(e), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3.
55. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797-98.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2798.
58. Id. at 2797.
59. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of War Victims (Cont'd), 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 786 (1988).
60. See generally Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J.
INT'L & POL'Y 419, 427-28 (1987). The rejected Protocol had been drafted by third world nations
who were anxious to grant combatant status to liberationists and guerillas who challenged "racist
regimes." The drafting unfortunately overlooked the consequences to innocent civilians and civil
order. President Reagan foresaw its ill-consequence.
582
[Vol. 34: 573, 2007] The Separation of Powers
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
military is asked to direct its aim at military targets and to preserve the lives
of civilians and POWs. For this to be possible, lawful soldiers must be
assured that civilians and prisoners are not taking aim to kill them. As one
writer succinctly put the matter:
Civilians who abuse their noncombatant status are a threat not only
to soldiers who abide by the rules, they endanger innocents
everywhere by drastically eroding the legal and customary restraints
on killing civilians. Restricting the use of arms to lawful
combatants has been a way of limiting war's savagery since at least
the Middle Ages. 6
1
Notwithstanding the importance of drawing and maintaining a reasonably
bright line between lawful and unlawful combatants, President George W.
Bush directed that al Qaeda and the Taliban be provided with "humane
treatment.,
62
The Court was unsatisfied, pointing to Article 75, which the plurality
claimed was more generous than President Bush's conception of such
treatment. 63 The difference is not apparent, however. Assuming Article 75
of Protocol I to be a restatement of customary international law, it prohibits
torture, hostage-taking, collective punishments, and respective threats to do
such acts. 64 It requires detainees be informed as to the reasons of their
detention and that detainees be released when the circumstances of, and
reasons for, their detention no longer exist. 65 Before and after the decision
in Hamdan, it is fair to say, the President would concede each of those
protections. It was in terms of the nature of required judicial process where
the President and the Court disagreed.
61. Andrew Apostolou & Frederic Smoler, The Geneva Convention is Not a Suicide Pact (2004)
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/usr-doc/Genevaconvention II 6 02_2.pdf.
62. See White House Memorandum, Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees 2
(Feb. 7, 2002), http://www/humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/etn/Gonzales/memos-dir/dir_20020207
_BushDet.pdf.
63. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798.
64. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 75(2)(b)-(e), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3.
65. Id. at art. 75(3).
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The dissenters (Justices Scalia and Alito) themselves write, joining with
Justice Thomas, that:
[I]t is appropriate to respond to the Court's resolution of the merits
of petitioner's claims because its opinion openly flouts our well-
established duty to respect the executive's judgment in matters of
military operations and foreign affairs. The Court's evident belief
that it is qualified to pass on the "military necessity" . . . of the
Commander in Chief's decision to employ a particular form of force
against our enemies is so antithetical to our constitutional structure
that it simply cannot go unanswered.66
The dissent undertakes to refute Justice Stevens point-by-point, but the
ultimate refutation was given by Congress.
A few months following Hamdan, the Congress specifically authorized
the military tribunals the President sought in The Military Commissions Act
of 2006.67 Each accused tried by Military Commission has the following
procedural safeguards: the presumption of innocence; proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt; the right of self-representation; protection against the
use of statements obtained by the use of torture; the right to call and cross
examine witnesses; the guarantee that nothing said by an accused to his
attorney, or anything derived therefrom, may be used against him at trial; no
adverse inference from remaining silent; the overall requirement that any
Military Commission proceeding be full and fair; a free military defense
counsel and the right to hire private counsel; and the right to be present at all
sessions of the military commission, other than those for deliberations and
68voting.
Evidentiary standards are as the President originally proposed, admitting
evidence that would have "probative value to a reasonable person., 6
9
Evidence may not be excluded on the grounds that it was not seized pursuant
to a search warrant.70 This standard of evidence takes into account the
unique battlefield environment that is different from traditional peacetime
law enforcement practices in the United States. Verdicts are by a two-thirds
vote, other than death which must be unanimous. 7' Each case which
includes a finding of guilt is referred to the Court of Military Commission
66. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2823 (Thomas, I., dissenting).
67. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
68. See id.
69. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 949a(b)(2)(A).
70. Id. at § 949a(b)(2)(B).
71. Id. at § 949m(a), m(b)(1)(C).
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Review.72 The Secretary of Defense will establish a Court of Military
Commission Review composed of at least three appellate military judges.
The judges may be military or civilian.73 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the validity of any final decisions of a Military Commission
case.74 The Supreme Court may review by writ of certiorari the final
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The President is now confident he has the authority to proceed. Justice
Stevens' view remains to be seen.
WHAT ABOUT SIGNING STATEMENTS? IS THE PRESIDENT PUTTING HIMSELF
ABOVE THE LAW THERE?
An ABA Task Force Report on Presidential Signing Statements recently
proposed a set of resolutions to curtail presidential power." The resolutions
(and accompanying report) are responsibly and thoughtfully written, by
responsible and thoughtful people. For the most part, the resolutions should
be just as thoughtfully rejected.
The Task Force legitimately reaffirms that the President has no general
dispensing authority. That is, enacted laws the President signs are to be
enforced, not suspended-unless the newly enacted law violates the
Constitution itself.7 6 Even the Task Force had to concede this qualification,
and when it does, the Report and the utility of its resolutions lose much of
their punch, since it is within the qualification where all the difficult issues
are hidden.
The general media reported the ABA Task Force missive as taking a
punch at President Bush.77 In truth, the ABA Task Force claims not to be
singling out the current occupant of the White House.78 It could not credibly
do so. As the ABA Task Force notes, for example, it was the standing
72. Id. at § 950c(a).
73. Id. at § 950f(a).
74. Id. at § 950f(b).
75. ABA Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine,
Formal Op. (2006), http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba-final-signing-statements_
recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf.
76. Id. at 19-20.
77. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Panel Chides Bush on Bypassing Law: ABA Group Cites Limits to
Power, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 2006, at Al.
78. See ABA Task Force, supra note 75, at 4-5.
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policy of the Clinton administration that "if ... the President, exercising his
independent judgment, determines both that a provision would violate the
Constitution and that it is probable that the Court would agree with him, the
President has the authority to decline to execute the statute., 79 This view,
Dellinger observed at the time, was shared by at least four sitting Justices
(Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter).t °
Nevertheless, what the Task Force recommends would appear to
overrule Dellinger and a good deal of constitutional history, doctrine, and
practice. The use of presidential signing statements can be traced back at
least to 1830 when President Andrew Jackson employed the device to give
his interpretation of a road appropriation. 8 1  But more importantly, the
Constitution is not hortatory fluff; it is law, and in the hierarchy of laws, it is
supreme. If the ABA Task Force means to elevate transient statute over
constitutional requirement, it has subverted the rule of law in the name of
preserving it.
Even though the ABA Task Force vastly understates the responsibility
of the President to assess the constitutionality of enactments presented for
his approval, the ABA Task Force does suggest some practical steps that
may avoid unnecessary constitutional clash. Most constructively, the ABA
Task Force recommends giving greater attention to, and fuller vetting of,
constitutional difference in the legislative process.8 2 That is all for the good.
There is no point in being cagey or coy in claims of authority, and were
greater public light shown upon such in legislative debate, the Congress
might be less likely to invade the executive, and the executive less likely to
claim trespass where none has been committed.
Other recommendations have less merit. The recommendation to create
congressional standing is yet another attempt to have political issues tried in
the courts. It is more the mindset of trial lawyers than constitutional
statesmen. The courts are not well suited to resolving political disputes, and
it is highly doubtful whether the ABA Task Force's recommendation, itself,
would pass constitutional muster in terms of the requirements of a "case or
controversy., 83  Signing statements generally do not present a justiciable
controversy. Whether it is the President or Congress that has overreached in
a given circumstance, the Framers supplied ample means by which the
79. Id. at 13 (quoting former head of OLC for President Clinton, Walter Dellinger).
80. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, on The Legal Significance
of Presidential Signing Statements to Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President (Nov. 3,
1993), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm.
81. ABA Task Force, supra note 75, at 7.
82. Id.at2l.
83. Id. at 25.
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legislative and the executive can defend themselves without adding to the
litigation burdens of the federal judiciary.
The ABA Task Force report should not be portrayed as an indication of
a constitutional crisis. Signing statements are merely a contemporary
reminder of the correctness of Madison's insight into human nature that the
concentration of power is best avoided by ambition checking ambition.
8 4
Whether Bush or Congress, or for that matter, the previous Presidents or
Congresses, had the more defensible side of individual matters requires
careful legal analysis of specific factual contexts. For this reason, it will be
unfortunate if the ABA Task Force report is used by legislative or anti-Bush
partisans to propagate the false view that presidential signing statements
represent an executive power grab or constitutional novelty. Presidential
signing statements ought not to be demonized. Most of these statements are
largely administrative-improving presidential supervision of the executive
branch, itself. Better to have a highly visible President interpret an
ambiguous statutory phrase than a near-invisible bureaucrat.
This same interest in accountability carries over to those occasions
where the President is at odds with Congress. Total opposition necessitates
a veto, of course, but a President should otherwise exercise his veto with
care. Outright disapproval is in tension with the well accepted precept of
construing statutes to avoid constitutional defect. A too ready veto also
sacrifices considerable legislative effort, and frequently ends, rather than
furthers, debate. It can be more deferential to legislative power to allow a
new law generally to go into effect, while openly highlighting provisions
that are believed to be constitutionally problematic. Of course, there is no
harm in the ABA Task Force's recommendation that the President send his
signing statements over to Congress, though, in truth, they are already quite
easy to find online.
No President is above the law. Of course, no Congress is either-a
point the Founders made when they rejected legislative supremacy in favor
of a written Constitution. The presidential signing of laws cannot be the
occasion for re-writing them, but it is inescapably and wisely an occasion for
re-canvassing constitutional meaning-especially in the area of foreign
affairs where such meaning is often decidedly and deliberately opaque. If
President Bush's statements can be faulted, it is that on occasion some of his
stated reservations are too cryptic to be understood. They are too much
preview and not enough movie. Merely reciting that a statute is subject to
84. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
the Constitution or powers reserved to the President speaks at too high a
level of generality to be effective; it is more likely simply to be provocative.
Nevertheless, signing statements are important because they do keep
faith with Madison's prescription for counteracting untoward ambition.85
Consider for a moment something the ABA Task Force apparently missed:
Congress' continued practice of lumping together numerous unrelated
provisions in omnibus bills, often inserting the most controversial provisions
in emergency appropriations measures passed at, or after, fiscal deadlines.
There are all too many examples of this practice, but let's reference just one:
the circumstances surrounding Franklin Roosevelt's approval of the Lend-
Lease Act, which provided vital support to our allies in World War 11.86
As presented to FDR, the Act contained a provision for the termination
of the President's authority upon the passage of a "concurrent resolution of
the two Houses .... ,,87 Roosevelt correctly thought this an unconstitutional
infringement of the presidential office because it provided for repeal without
following the required procedure set out in the Constitution, which includes
presentment to the President.88 Interestingly, then Attorney General Robert
Jackson, later a Justice of the Supreme Court, was more equivocal,
speculating that the statutory limitation on the President's authority might be
viewed not as a repeal but "a reservation or limitation by which the granted
power would expire or terminate." 89 Roosevelt would have none of it, and
in a rare twist, issued a legal opinion to his Attorney General stating that he
"felt constrained to sign the measure [to meet a momentous emergency of
great magnitude in world affairs], in spite of the fact that it contained a
provision which, in [his] opinion, is clearly unconstitutional." 90 Roosevelt
directed the Attorney General to put his legal opinion in the "official files of
the Department of Justice" in order to preclude his approval of the Act from
being used "as a precedent for any future legislation comprising provisions
of a similar nature." 91 Roosevelt was right about the unconstitutionality of
this type of provision, as was confirmed later by the Supreme Court in INS v.
Chadha92 in 1983, and he also correctly anticipated that Congress would
85. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison).
86. See Act to Promote the Defense of the United States ("Lend-Lease Act"), 55 Stat. 31 (1941).
87. Id. at § 3(c).
88. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
89. Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1353, 1355 (1953).
90. Id. at 1357.
91. Id. at 1358.
92. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that an act authorizing one house of Congress, by resolution, to
invalidate a decision of the Executive Branch is unconstitutional because an action by the House
pursuant to that section is essentially legislative and thus subject to constitutional requirements of
passage by a majority of both Houses and presentation to the President).
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continue its efforts to circumvent the presidential judgment and veto in
similar ways. Does Congress always act in this devious manner? Of course
not. It is no more fair to tar the Congress in such fashion than it is to accuse
President Bush of conspiring to place himself "above the law."
So putting overstatement aside, should the President and the Attorney
General enforce statutes that they believe are unconstitutional? The logical
and better answer is "no," but the practical mind remembers that Andrew
Johnson didn't think so either, and this thinking nearly got him removed
from office. Congress had passed the Tenure-of-Office Act over Johnson's
veto. 93 The Act precluded Johnson from freely removing members of his
cabinet. 94 Notwithstanding the law's passage, Johnson removed Secretary
of War Stanton, and this became one of the articles of impeachment. In
Johnson's defense, his counsel stated:
If the law be upon its very face in flat contradiction of the plain
expressed provisions of the Constitution, as if a law should forbid
the President to grant a pardon in any case, or if the law should
declare that he should not be Commander in Chief, or if the law
should declare that he should take no part in making of a treaty, I
say the President, without going to the Supreme Court of the United
States, maintaining the integrity of his department, which for the
time being is entrusted to him, is bound to execute no such
legislation; and he is cowardly and untrue to the responsibility of his
position if he should execute it. 95
Johnson's counsel had the winning argument. Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase, casting the deciding vote against Johnson's impeachment, declared
that the President has no duty to execute a statute that "directly attacks and
impairs the executive power confided to him by [the Constitution]."96
Are the objections being raised by President Bush uniformly of this
quality? The sheer number of Bush statements does suggest some
93. An Act Regulating the Tenure of Certain Civil Offices, 14 Stat. 430 (1867).
94. Id.
95. 2 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE SENATE OF
THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANORS 200 (1868).
96. ROBERT B. WARDEN, AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRIVATE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF
SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 685 (1874).
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unwarranted exuberance for one's own position. 97  As the late William
French Smith opined, it is best to confine the presidential prerogative to
those "historical examples" where Congress "attempt[s] to alter the
distribution of constitutional power by arrogating to itself a power which the
Executive believes the Constitution does not confer on Congress but,
instead, reposes in him." 98  Such encroachments on the executive are
especially apt for signing statement qualification.
In the end, for all its sound and fury, the ABA Task Force cannot escape
some rather basic postulates. John Marshall was correct that "an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void." 99 And the President has
the express responsibility to "take care that the Laws [including the
Constitution as the supreme law] be faithfully executed."10 0  Requiring
Presidents to enforce-as the ABA Task Force proposes-an invalid law
would be contrary to constitutional duty and oath. This is a proposition as
old as the Republic. James Wilson, a principal drafter and advocate of the
Constitution, wrote that "the President of the United States could shield
himself and refuse to carry into effect an act that violates the
Constitution."' ' But then, Wilson wasn't on the ABA Task Force.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Hamdan, for all the reasons stated, was an extraordinary break from
precedent. The most vocal opponents of the President admit as much.
Writing in the New York Review of Books, Georgetown Law Professor
David Cole writes: "To say that Hamdan faced an uphill battle is a gross
understatement." '10 2 In light of past precedent, in light of the enemy alien
status of the defendant, in light of the timing of the lawsuit before the
fairness of the military proceedings themselves could even be assessed, in
light of the fact that there was a congressional law that seemed to deprive the
Court of jurisdiction, it's a surprise Hamdan won. 103 "The fact that the
Court decided the case at all in the face of Congress's efforts to strip the
97. See ABA Task Force, supra note 75, at 2.
98. Letter from William French Smith to Peter Rodino 5 (Feb. 22, 1985) (on file with author).
99. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
100. ABA Task Force, supra note 75.
101. Statement of James Wilson during the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Dec. 1, 1787),
reprinted in JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMEDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 446 (2d ed. 1891).
102. David Cole, Why the Court Said No, 53 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 13, Aug. 10, 2006,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19212.
103. See id.
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Court of jurisdiction is remarkable." 104 Listen to those words, uphill battle,
setting aside past precedent, remarkable disregard of jurisdictional limits,
break from historic deference. President asking for a blank check? It is
more a case of the judiciary being involved in executive identity theft.
Before taking questions, one brief word on why the President has
pursued military commissions. First and foremost: because al Qaeda are
unlawful combatants who by every standard of international rule and
practice do not fight as honorable soldiers but as terrorists out of uniform
who take aim at civilian populations and endanger them and our own
military men and women, who are then put in this tremendously awkward
circumstance of having to fight a war in the context of residences, schools,
and hospitals.
Second, the President is also concerned about the integrity of the
criminal justice system. Yes, it is true, if we wanted to fight the war by
criminal prosecution, we could have attempted it. We did attempt it several
times. There was a World Trade Center trial that lasted a good number of
years in New York in the 1990s that disclosed, among other things in the
public record, that if a commercial airliner hit the World Trade Center, it
would destroy it. There are grave risks proceeding by the normal criminal
process intended for the prosecution of criminals within a civil order and
terrorists seeking to destroy civil order altogether.
Third, we also know that the system has a tendency to get distorted in
terrorism trials. Zacharias Moussaoui is indeed serving a lifetime
sentence. 105 He did have a criminal process, but it's not one recognizable to
the Sixth Amendment. His ability to confront witnesses and to compel
evidence for his defense was, in fact, denied as a matter of national security
in terms of his access to Ramzi Binalshibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
and the others who would have had information about his involvement.
06
The President and I differ on Iraq. I suspect Justice Stevens may share
like reservations. But neither of us are the President with the authority of the
Commander in Chief in wartime. Justice Stevens held it was unnecessary to
address the scope of that authority in an opinion that then proceeded to
undermine it. 107
104. Id.
105. See Mark Memmott, Opinions on Moussaoui Verdict: Everybody's Got One, USA TODAY,
May 4, 2006, available at http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2006/05/opinions on-mou.html.
106. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453,476 (4th Cir. 2004).
107. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). Although ruling that the
military commission at issue was invalid, the Court declined to determine the specific scope of
Justice Jackson, who voted in a far less consequential case
(Youngstown) to limit presidential power, once quipped that the Justices "are
not final because [they] are infallible .... We are infallible," said Justice
Jackson, "only because we are final."' 8 John Roberts told us that no one
ever goes to a ball game to watch the umpire. In truth, the result in Hamdan
in the Chief s absence proves that sometimes it's important to go to the
game to keep your eye on the umpire.
QUESTIONS BY DAVID G. SAVAGE
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Fire when ready.
DAVID G. SAVAGE: I'm not sure I understand the big problem here.
In November of 2001, two months after the 9/11 attack, President Bush put
out the executive order saying we need a new system to try terrorists. 109
These people are not citizens. They are accused terrorists. I don't know
anybody around the country then or even now who disagrees with that, but I
don't understand what the Supreme Court ended up disagreeing with-why
didn't he ask Congress? If you're going to create a new system for trials,
why not get legislation, and why didn't the Bush administration ask
Congress to pass some bill that would essentially authorize the military
tribunal?
PROFESSOR KMIEC: You know, in 2006 David, that looks eminently
rational. But I also think he was being advised that he had sufficient
authority already. First, an examination of Title 10, the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, demonstrates that the Uniform Code of Military Justice
itself, as an existing body of statutory law, does not preclude the creation of
military commissions, and, in fact, specifically authorizes military
commissions different from courts-martial with the admonition that the
crimes that will be tried before military commissions will be those
recognized by the laws of war, and with the further admonition that the
military commission, wherever practicable, should follow the rules of
procedure that apply to courts-martial. " 0
I think that on that statute alone the President could have been
responsibly advised that he had authority to establish military tribunals,
Executive authority to convene such commissions without the sanction of Congress during times of
"controlling necessity." See id. at 2774.
108. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
109. See Remarks Following a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange With Reporters, (Nov. 19,
2001) in 2001 BOOK II PUB. PAPERS 1423, 1425.
110. See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006).
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separate and apart from whatever inherent authority is his under Article II.
There's also the separate statutory argument about the AUMF, which as you
know is extremely sweeping in its terms, "all necessary and appropriate
force.""' If you read the AUMF against the history of military tribunals,
one of the things you see is that there has never been a Supreme Court ruling
against the President in time of war questioning his military tribunal
authority going as far back as the trial of Major Andre by George
Washington, coming forward to Lincoln's use of these tribunals to that of
President Wilson, and so forth.
So, yes, would a specific statute have been helpful? Sure. Would it
have been implausible and irresponsible for the office of legal counsel to
advise the President that he had statutory authority already? I think not. I
think that was especially plausible close to 9/11.
MARCIA COYLE: There's some who say that Hamdan makes clear
now that the President lacked authority for the Domestic Surveillance
Program, and I was wondering-because of the reliance on the AUMF-I
was wondering if you see it that way. I see Erwin nodding his head,
indicating that he has an opinion. But I was wondering, do you see it that
way, and also, actually, it does appear eventually that question will get to the
Supreme Court, judging by the litigation around the country right now.
Knowing that the Chief Justice was on the side of presidential power in
Hamdan in the lower court, sort of reading an inkling into how he views
presidential authority in his dissent in the Oregon case, what do you see the
fate of the challenge to the NSA Program before the current Supreme Court?
PROFESSOR KMIEC: On the terrorist surveillance program, Judge
Anna Diggs Taylor in the Eastern District of Michigan did find it
unconstitutional as you report. 2 She found it to be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment as well as the First Amendment and found it not to be
authorized by the authorization and use of military force. 113 The President,
of course, I think, will continue to make the argument that the AUMF is
broad enough to support that authorization.
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111. Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp, 2002).
112. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
113. Id.
He will also argue the inapplicability of FISA, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. 114 FISA was largely a statute designed to address the
problem of domestic security. When Congress got to the issues of war and
peace, there were substantial constitutional objections raised by Attorney
General Griffin Bell. "1
5
Griffin Bell argued that the President has authority in wartime to
conduct military intelligence." 6 The way Congress responded was by
creating a fifteen-day exception for war. 7 Well, no one seriously believes
that you can complete a war in fifteen days, at least not the way we're
fighting it presently, and given that, what those fifteen days envisioned was
another statute. I think the President will continue to argue is that the "other
statute" is the authorization for the use of military force-that is assuming
Congress does not preempt the whole matter with an even more specific
authorization. 118
But there's another problem with the case going up to the Sixth Circuit,
and that is that the core of this program has not been discussed or disclosed
publicly. It is a state secret. The general outlines of the program have been
outlined, but whenever Alberto Gonzales or any other member of the
administration has discussed this program, they have been very careful to
say, "We can't tell you about the operational side," whatever that is--data
mining or cross-matching by computers or what. No one can say.
Judge Taylor skirted the state secret issue in an unsatisfactory way. I
think the appellate court, looking at the fact that the operational heart of the
terrorist surveillance program is not known and is, in fact, guarded as a state
secret may well dismiss the case on those grounds. And if that is the case,
it's not going to get to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Erwin, I know, disagrees. We should give him time to disagree.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY: I'll be very brief and try to focus on
Marcia's excellent question.
To me this is all about the question: is the President above the law? I
think what's consistent about the examples we're talking about here, and
others, is that there is a President who is asserting that he can violate the law
114. 50U.S.C.§§ 1801-1863 (2006).
115. Foreign Intelligence Elec. Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R. 9745, H.R.
7308, and H.R. 5632 before the Subcomm. On Legislation of the House Comm. on Intelligence, 95th
Cong. Sess. 15 (1978) (testimony of Att'y Gen. Griffin B. Bell).
116. See id.
117. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801.
118. Subsequent to the symposium, the House, but not the Senate, passed a specific statute
authorizing the President's surveillance program. See Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act,
H.R. 5825, 190th Cong. (2006).
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and not be checked by any court. This is an administration with a memo
written saying that the President can authorize torture, even though there's a
treaty and a statute to the contrary. The President is claiming the authority
to detain American citizens apprehended in the United States without having
to comply with the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
With regard to the military commissions, the President is claiming that
individuals could be detained indefinitely in Guantanamo, even tortured, and
there would be no court able to review it. The President is claiming that
there is no authority or courts to check warrantless electronic eavesdropping,
notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment and the specific statutory provision
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
So I think what's omitted from Doug's presentation is the extent to
which this administration is claiming unchecked executive power.
Now, that's my transition to Marcia's question. I think there's a very
strong parallel to what the Supreme Court did in the Hamdan case to what it
will be likely to do with regard to electronic eavesdropping. The reason is in
Hamdan, the Supreme Court said there's statutory and treaty provisions on
point. " 9 The Court said the Uniform Code of Military Justice in Common
Article Three of the Geneva accounts were directly on the point and the
President was violating these and that was impermissible. 20 The Court was
unwilling to regard the general authorization of the use of military force as
enough.
To put this in the context of electronic eavesdropping. There's a
constitutional provision on point: the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant
for intercepting of conversations except in the very narrow exceptions that
aren't present here. 2 ' Also, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act says
all electronic eavesdropping either has to meet the procedures of that statute
or another federal statute, Title III, and neither was met. 122
So what is the executive claim here as to how it can violate the law?
Two things. One is an inherent presidential power; that the President has the
authority, just by virtue of being President and Commander in Chief to
authorize searches. But I don't think the Court is going to buy that because
there's no stopping point. If the President can authorize electronic
eavesdropping without a warrant, can he authorize federal law enforcement
119. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2756-57 (2006).
120. Id. at 2780.
121. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
122. 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2004).
to go to people's houses without a warrant and search there? If the
President's powers can trump the Fourth Amendment, why not the First
Amendment? Why can't he even cancel elections required under the
Constitution? Where is the stopping point to the President's power?
The other claim the executive makes is the authority to use of military
force, but to get to your question, I think Hamdan is directly on point
because that's where the Court says it's not a blank check. A general
authorization for military force doesn't mean the President can do anything
the President wants like creating military tribunals or authorizing electronic
eavesdropping that violates the Constitution or federal statutes.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Of course, Justice O'Connor, in her plurality
opinion in Hamdi said the authorization for the use of military force includes
the necessary incidents of war which she described as the capture, detention,
and trial of enemy combatants. '23 So there are some things that are read into
the general force authorization by the Court itself.
AUDIENCE QUESTIONS FACILITATED BY PROFESSOR PUSHAW
PROFESSOR PUSHAW: The audience members I'm afraid share
Professor Chemerinsky's skepticism. A couple questions. I'm just reporting
here. Here's one: You seem overly sympathetic to President Bush having a
blank check returned. Have there been any recent cases where you feel
President Bush is trying to play monarch, or do you feel that he has included
all pertinent voices and the checks and balances required?
Here's another: Isn't the military tribunal system intended to permit the
U.S. to indefinitely detain individuals suspected of terrorist intent, but in the
absence of sufficient evidence of either overt acts in support of terrorism or a
conspiracy to commit terrorism-in short, detain virtually anyone at the
wisdom and discretion of government?
Another audience member said that you've justified President Bush's
establishment of military tribunals that take jurisdiction away from the
judicial system by saying, "The President is motivated to have a legal
system," but the President is not in charge of the legal system. He is limited
to the executive system; so doesn't your argument demonstrate his lack of
authority for military tribunals?
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Those are all good questions or comments. On
occasion, I have been troubled by the unnecessary and hypothetical scope of
some of the legal analysis that the President has been given, especially on
123. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
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the matter of interrogation practices. I think that started things off on a bad
foot. On the other hand, I also think it's important for those of us who
criticize in 2006 to remember the circumstances and uncertainties in 2001.
With regard to putting himself above the law, I don't think the President
has that desire, and I think, for example, the most recent condemnation by
the ABA of the President's use of signing statements was most unfortunate
and most imprudent. The ABA's resolution was challenged in its wisdom
by our friend Laurence Tribe, who was with us for the last conference and
also challenged by Walter Dellinger, and by the leadership of the office of
legal counsel in the Clinton administration, and for this simple reason: the
President has an obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed
and the laws include the Constitution of the United States. I think it was
Walter Dellinger who wrote in the New York Times that if Congress enacted
as part of an omnibus bill that the ABA President should be arrested and
detained indefinitely, he might want the President to note in the signing
statement that he doesn't intend to enforce that provision. 124
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124. Walter Dellinger, A Slip ofthe Pen, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at AI7.
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